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RAFAEL M. FRONGILLO, University of Colorado Boulder
We study the problem of designing optimal auctions under restrictions on the set of permissible allocations.
In addition to allowing us to restrict to deterministic mechanisms, we can also indirectly model non-additive
valuations. We prove a strong duality result, extending a result due to Daskalakis et al. [2015], that guar-
antees the existence of a certificate of optimality for optimal restricted mechanisms. As a corollary of our
result, we provide a new characterization of the set of allocations that the optimal mechanism may actually
use. To illustrate our result we find and certify optimal mechanisms for four settings where previous frame-
works do not apply, and provide new economic intuition about some of the tools that have previously been
used to find optimal mechanisms.
1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of revenue maximization a monopolist seller with a single item to sell to
a single buyer was solved by Myerson [1981], who showed that the optimal mechanism
provides a menu with two options to the buyer: get the item with probability zero for free
or get the item with probability one at a price that depends on the distribution of the
buyer’s value. The setting with multiple items is significantly more challenging, however,
even when restricted to two items, as a line of work from economics has shown [McAfee
and McMillan 1988; Rochet and Chone 1998; Thanassoulis 2004; Manelli and Vincent 2006,
2007; Chung and Olszewski 2007; Pavlov 2011; No¨ldeke and Samuelson 2015].
Significant progress has been made in the past few years, using a new duality technique
introduced by Daskalakis et al. [2013]. Subsequent work has refined this technique, allowing
for the design of both optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms in a variety of set-
tings [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014; Daskalakis et al. 2015; Giannakopoulos 2015;
Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2015]. See Daskalakis [2015] for a survey. However, all
this previous work has had two key restrictions:
(1) valuations are additive, in the sense that the value for a bundle of items is the sum of
values for the individual items, and
(2) the mechanism can choose any (randomized) allocation of the items.
We relax this second restriction, by showing how to extend this duality approach to mech-
anism design problems where the set of permissible allocations is more general. This allows
problems with multiple copies of items or a requirement that the mechanism be determinis-
tic. Indirectly, it also allows us to relax the first restriction. The reason is that any problem
can be made additive by redefining the space of types to assign a value to each possible
bundle. However, after this transformation the mechanism must be restricted to only offer
probability distributions over bundles. Thus, by allowing restrictions on allocations we also
enlarge the space of valuations to which these techniques can be applied.
1.1. General Duality
Our main result is a generalization of the strong duality framework of Daskalakis et al.
[2015] between optimal mechanism design and a dual problem that can be interpreted as
finding an optimal matching, and we broadly follow their approach.
—The standard way of phrasing the optimal mechanism design problem is in terms select-
ing a convex consumer surplus function u. The constraint that u is a valid mechanism
corresponds requiring that the subgradients of u correspond to permissible allocations.
The revenue of a given u is then easily written as an expression in terms of both u and its
subgradients. However, this formulation seems difficult to work with, so Daskalakis et al.
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be rewritten as
∫
udµ, thus excluding the subgradients of u from the objective function.
We adopt this approach wholesale.
—To define feasible dual solutions, their approach makes use of the notion of convex dom-
inance. A measure µ convex dominates a measure µ′ if
∫
udµ ≥∈ udµ′ for all (non-
decreasing) convex u. This makes convex dominance an instance of an integral stochastic
order [Mu¨ller and Stoyan 2002]. The key to our approach is to use more general such
orders, in particular taking the order induced by set of u that are actually feasible mech-
anisms rather than all convex u.
—Using our more general stochastic order, we prove a duality theorem of which their result
is a special case.
—To illustrate our framework, we illustrate optimal auctions and corresponding dual wit-
nesses for a number of settings that prior techniques could not handle. First, we restric-
tions on the set of possible allocations, specifically the case of two item i.i.d uniform
[0,1] items with the restriction to allocate at most one item and the restriction to al-
locate exactly one item. Second, we consider two i.i.d exponentially distributed items
with the restriction to deterministic mechanisms. The previous examples have restricted
the set of allocations but used additive valuations. Our final example looks at a setting
with non-additive valuations (there are two items and the goods are complements) and
unrestricted allocations, and shows that bundling is optimal.
1.2. Finding Good Mechanisms
Our main theorem is a tool that certifies that a mechanism is optimal—it does not directly
provide guidance on how to find the optimal mechanism in the first place. Thus, we provide
several additional results that provide additional structure to aid in the search for good
mechanisms.
—We prove a lemma showing that optimal mechanisms only use allocations that are ex-
posed points of the set of allowable allocations. In particular, all previous known optimal
mechanisms for the additive case are zero set mechanisms [Daskalakis et al. 2015], where
the buyer is either allocated nothing or at least one item with probability 1. We show
that in fact a slightly weaker version of this is a necessary condition, and that suitably
generalized it holds beyond the additive setting.
—One useful observation made by Daskalakis et al. [2015] for the case where the optimal
mechanism has a finite number of allocations is that if cell(s) is the set of types that re-
ceive allocation s then
∫
cell(s)
µ = 0. We provide economic intuition for this fact, showing
that it corresponds to the simple first-order condition that an optimal mechanism prices
each allocation optimally. That is, the derivative of revenue with respect to changing the
price of any one allocation is 0.
—Any feasible dual solution provides an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal mecha-
nism. Giannakopoulos [2015] uses this observation to certify the approximate optimality
of mechanisms. We examine our dual problem, and show that it suggests that a better
understanding of the integral stochastic orders we use would shed light on the question
of how well the optimal mechanism can be approximated by a deterministic mechanism.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let O be a set of outcomes. There is a single agent whose preference over outcomes can
be represented as a function x ∈ RO≥0, known as the agent’s type. That is, this function
associates each outcome with a non-negative value for the agent. We work in a Bayesian
setting, so there is a distribution f over RO≥0 from which the agent’s type is drawn. An
allocation s is a linear function in the dual space RO → R. The value of the agent is then
s(x). If O is finite, both x and s can be represented as vectors of dimension |O| = n and
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are restricted to the finite case we assume that O is finite and use the s · x notation, but
most of our remaining techniques do not rely on this assumption and would generalize if
this analysis does.
Despite calling O a set of outcomes, our formalism does not restrict s to ensure that
at most one outcome happens or that a given outcome can happen a single time. Thus
our formalism can handle auctions with multiple items or even multiple copies of a single
item with additive valuations in two distinct ways. O can be the set of individual items
(or types of items), in which case s indicates how many (in expectation) of each item
are allocated. Alternatively, we can let O be the set of all bundles of items, and s give
a probability distribution over bundles. When there is a choice of representations, it is
convenient to select one that results in a type distribution f that meets the requirements of
the derivation in Section 2.2 while also minimizing |O|. For an example that takes advantage
of this flexibility, see Section 4.5.
As this possibility of multiple representations suggests, it may be natural to have a re-
stricted set of types X and feasible allocations S to accurately describe a given problem.
For example, we can restrict X to capture additive valuations or that goods are substitutes,
while we can restrict S to impose constraints such as limited quantities of an item available,
that s is a probability distribution, or that the mechanism is deterministic (i.e. s has an
integer value in each coordinate). Previous work on optimal mechanisms for the additive
case has considered various restrictions on X , such as requiring values to lie in [0, 1]|O|, but
has always taken S to be [0, 1]|O|. Without loss of generality, we require X to be convex.
2.1. Convex Representation
In this setting it is without loss of generality to restrict to truthful direct revelation mecha-
nisms. These consist of a rule that takes a report of x from the agent and then selects an
allocation s and payment p, which gives the agent a utility of u(x) = s(x) · x − p(x). A
standard fact is that we can represent such mechanisms as convex functions u where s(x) is
a subgradient of u at x and p(x) = u(x)−s(x) ·x. Thus, the set U(X,S) of convex functions
on X that are subdifferentiable with subgradients in S1 corresponds exactly to the truth-
ful direct revelation mechanisms. We further require that the mechanism be individually
rational, a restriction we enforce via the objective function described in the next section.
Given a set of functions U , a geometric structure that will prove useful for our arguments
is the cone generated by U , which consists of all scaled versions of elements of U . That is,
U◦ = {λu | λ ≥ 0 ∧ u ∈ U}. Our arguments also make use of the convex hull conv(U) and
the closure cl(U).
Finally, we make use of the fact that since u is restricted to have subgradients in S, a
simple upper bound on the difference in the value of u between points x and y is u(x)−u(y) ≤
sups∈S s · (x − y) = ℓS(x, y). We will be using the concise ℓS notation for this supremum
frequently. We require S to be closed and bounded, which ensures that this supremum is
finite and realized. To see the importance of closure, consider the case of selling a single item,
with S = [0, 1). There is no optimal mechanism restricted to this S. We can approximate the
optimal auction with S = [0, 1] arbitrarily well, but cannot realize it because the optimal
auction only offers the item for sale with probability 1. Similarly, without boundedness we
could take S = [0,∞) and there would be no optimal auction because it is optimal to sell
as much of the item as possible.
1Of course, any u with subgradients in S in general has subgradients in conv(S) as well. We say “subgradients
in S” to mean that u is supported by S alone: we can write u(x) = sups∈S s · x+ cs for some constants cs.
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Following Daskalakis et al. [2015], as long as the pdf of the type distribution f is differen-
tiable, we can write our problem as trying to choose the optimal consumer surplus function
u with respect to a measure µ. That is, we make use of the following definition and result
from their work.
Definition 2.1. Let X ′ ⊂ Rn≥0 be a well-behaved2 set of types. Let f : X ′ → R≥0 be a
(differentiable) probability density function with bounded partial derivatives. Let z0 ∈ Rn≥0
be any point which is coordinate-wise less than all points in X ′. The signed Radon measure
µ is a transformed measure of f if the relation∫
hdµ = h(z0) +
∫
∂X′
h(z)f(z)z · nˆdz −
∫
X′
h(z)(∇f(z) · z + (n+ 1)f(z))dz
holds for all continuous bounded functions h : Rn → R, where nˆ denotes the outer unit
normal field to the boundary ∂X ′.
Theorem 2.2 ([Daskalakis et al. 2015]). Let X ′ ⊂ Rn≥0 be a well-behaved set of
types. Let f : X ′ → R≥0 be a (differentiable) probability density function with bounded
partial derivatives. Then the problem of determining the optimal IC and IR mechanism for
a single additive buyer whose type is distributed according to f is equivalent to solving the
optimization problem
sup
u∈U(X,S)
∫
X
udµ
Where X = [0,M ]n ⊃ X ′ and µ is a transformed measure of f .
Essentially, their result says that as long as we pick a “nice” f , it has a transformed mea-
sure µ such that finding the optimal mechanism is the same as maximizing
∫
X
udµ, where
we have enlarged the set of types to be a hypercube. While this theorem requires X ′ to be
bounded, they show that this can be relaxed as long as f decays sufficiently rapidly, and we
use this extension in Section 4.4. Earlier work from has used more restricted versions of this
observation. For example, in economics, Manelli and Vincent [2006] and Thanassoulis [2004]
used integration by parts to get such a measure µ, while in computer science, special cases
of this approach were used by Daskalakis et al. [2013] and Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias
[2014].
2.3. Measure Theory
As our new objective involves a measure µ, we introduce some notation and definitions from
measure theory. Let X ⊂ Rn be compact. Then
— µ ∈ Radon(X), the set of signed Radon measures supported within X .
—By the Jordan decomposition theorem, µ = µ+ − µ− where µ+, µ− ∈ Radon+(X), the
set of positive Radon measures supported within X . Intuitively µ+ is the positive part
of µ and µ− is the negative part.
—For γ ∈ Radon(X × X) (or Radon+(X × X)), the marginal measures γ1 and γ2 ∈
Radon(X) (or Radon+(X)) are defined as γ1(X
′) = γ(X ′, X) and γ2(X ′) = γ(X,X ′).
2.4. Stochastic Orders
Having reduced our objective function to something of the form
∫
X udµ, previous duality
based approaches have observed that it is useful to upper bound this with a transformation
2X′ is well behaved if it is a Jordan-measurable bounded Lipschitz domain
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∫
udµ ≤ ∫ udµ′. The problem is that we do not
know what u is, so we need this relation to hold for a large enough class of functions. This
guarantee is provided by integral stochastic orders [Mu¨ller and Stoyan 2002]. Let U be some
set of functions X → R. Then µ′ U µ if
∫
X udµ
′ ≥ ∫X udµ for all u ∈ U . Orders used in
prior work include the stochastic order (U is all increasing functions) and the convex order
(U is all convex functions). The natural order for our setting is to take U to be all feasible
candidates for u. That is, U = U(X,S). Since this order is entirely determined by X and
S, for brevity we will write X,S rather than U(X,S).
3. GENERAL STRONG DUALITY
Our main result is the following theorem, which establishes strong duality between the
optimal mechanism u an a matching γ.
Theorem 3.1. Let X = [0,M ]n and let µ ∈ Radon(X) such that µ(X) = 0. Then
sup
u∈U(X,S))
∫
X
udµ = min
γ∈Radon+(X×X)
γ1−γ2X,Sµ
∫
X×X
ℓS(x, y)dγ(x, y) (1)
Note that it is part of the theorem that the min is realized. While we do not prove
that the sup is realized, it is realized whenever an optimal mechanism exists. Theorem 2 of
Daskalakis et al. [2015] is a special case of theorem with S = [0, 1]n. They directly prove
that the sup is realized in this case.
The structure of our proof parallels that of Daskalakis et al. [2015], which in turn par-
allels the structure of the proof of Monge-Kantorovich duality for optimal transport given
by Villani [2003]. Just as the technical details of their proof differ from the proof of Monge-
Kantorovich duality due to an added convexity constraint, so to do ours differ from theirs
due to an added subgradient constraint.
To prove the theorem, we use three lemmas. We begin with a simple proof of weak duality.
Note that weak duality alone is enough to apply our framework to practical examples. The
remainder of our results are only needed to show that in fact our framework always applies.
Lemma 3.2.
sup
u∈U(X,S)
∫
X
udµ ≤ inf
γ∈Radon+(X×X)
γ1−γ2X,Sµ
∫
X×X
ℓS(x, y)dγ(x, y) .
Proof. Fix feasible u and γ.∫
X
udµ ≤
∫
X
ud(γ1 − γ2)
=
∫
X×X
u(x)− u(y)dγ(x, y)
≤
∫
X×X
ℓS(x, y)dγ(x, y) .
The first inequality follows by domination, the second by ℓ being an upper bound on the
difference in the value of u between any two points.
The next lemma is the most technical, and shows strong duality for a related problem.
Ultimately we will combine this with weak duality to show strong duality for our desired
problem.
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sup
φ(x)−ψ(y)≤ℓS(x,y)
φ,ψ∈cl(conv(U◦(X,S)))
∫
X
φdµ+ −
∫
X
ψdµ− = min
γ∈Radon+(X×X)
γ1X,Sµ+
µ−X,Sγ2
∫
X×X
ℓS(x, y)dγ(x, y)
Proof. The proof makes use of Fenchel-Rockafellar Duality (specifically in its symmetric
form [Borwein and Vanderwerff 2010, Exercise 4.4.17], although we use the version of the
conditions for strong duality given by [Villani 2003]).
Theorem (Fenchel-Rockafellar Duality). Let E be a Banach space, E∗
its dual, and proper Θ,Ξ : E → R with Θ convex and Ξ concave. Then
sup(Ξ−Θ) ≤ inf(Θ∗ − Ξ∗),
where Θ∗ and Ξ∗ are the convex and concave duals respectively. Further, if there
exists e ∈ E where Θ(e) and Ξ(e) are finite and Θ is continuous at e, this holds
with equality and the infimum is realized.
Our proof also makes use of the Fenchel-Moreau theorem, which says that a proper convex
f = f∗∗ iff f is lsc (equivalently closed).
Let CB(X ×X) be the set of continuous, bounded functions X ×X → R. Note its dual
space is Radon(X×X). To make use of the theorem, we can split the domain constraint into
two pieces and phrase the optimization problem on the right hand side as infγ Θ
∗(γ)−Ξ∗(γ),
where
Θ∗(γ) =
{∫
X×X ℓS(x, y)dγ(x, y) if γ ∈ Radon+(X ×X)
+∞ otherwise
and
Ξ∗(γ) =
{
0 if γ1 X,S µ+ and µ− X,S γ2
−∞ otherwise
Note that we use a ∗ because these functions are on the dual space. Θ∗ is closed and
convex as it is linear on its domain, which is a closed convex set. Similarly, Ξ∗ is closed
and concave as its domain is a closed convex set. Thus, by Fenchel-Moreau we have that
Θ∗ = Θ∗∗∗ and Ξ∗ = Ξ∗∗∗.
We can calculate Θ∗∗ as
Θ∗∗(f) = sup
γ∈Radon+(X×X)
∫
X×X
(f(x, y)− ℓS(x, y))dγ(x, y)
=
{
0 if ℓS ≥ f
+∞ otherwise
For the second equality, note that in the first case the difference is non-positive at every
point and γ is non-negative, so the the supremum is realized by taking γ = 0. In the second
case, take any point where the difference is positive and choose a γ that puts an arbitrarily
high measure on that point and 0 measure elsewhere.
Note that (Θ∗∗)∗ = Θ∗ and Θ∗∗ is closed and convex. Thus we can take Θ = Θ∗∗ and its
dual and double dual will be Θ∗ and Θ∗∗ respectively.
For Ξ∗∗, we proceed by guessing a closed concave Ξ∗∗ and confirming that its dual is in
fact Ξ∗. Take
Ξ∗∗(f) =
{∫
X
φd(µ+)−
∫
X
ψd(µ−) if ∃φ, ψ ∈ cl(conv(U◦(X,S))) : f(x, y) = φ(x) − ψ(y)
−∞ otherwise,
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f∈CBX×X
∫
X×X
f(x, y)d(γ(x, y)) − Ξ∗∗(f)
= inf
φ,ψ∈cl(conv(U◦(X,S)))
∫
X
φd(γ1 − µ+) +
∫
X
ψd(µ− − γ2)
=
{
0 if γ1 X,S µ+ and µ− X,S γ2
−∞ otherwise
= Ξ∗(γ)
The penultimate equality follows from the following observation. If γ1 X,S µ+, the integral
is always non-negative. Taking φ = 0 makes it 0, and similarly for φ. If γ1 6X,S µ+, then
there is some φ ∈ U(X,S) for which the integral is negative. As we are allowed to scale it
arbitrarily in U◦(X,S), the infimum is infinite (and similarly for ψ). Since Ξ∗∗ is closed and
concave, we can again take Ξ = Ξ∗∗.
The final detail to apply the theorem is to find an f such that Θ(f) and Ξ(f) are finite
and Θ is continuous at f . Take f(x, y) = −1. Θ(f) = 0 and Ξ(f) = − ∫X dµ−. Θ(f ′) = 0
for all f ′ such that ||f − f ′||∞ ≤ 1. Thus, Θ is continuous at f .
We now apply Fenchel-Rockafellar duality, giving us the following:
sup
f∈CB(X×X)
Ξ(f)−Θ(f) = min
γ∈Radon(X×X)
Θ∗(γ)− Ξ∗(γ)
sup
φ(x)−ψ(y)≤ℓS(x,y)
φ,ψ∈cl(conv(U◦(X,S)))
∫
X
φdµ+ −
∫
X
ψdµ− = min
γ∈Radon+(X×X)
γ1X,Sµ+
µ−X,Sγ2
∫
X×X
ℓS(x, y)dγ(x, y)
The final lemma takes the supremum over two functions for which we proved strong
duality in the previous lemma, and shows that we can convert that not just a single function,
but one in U(X,S) as well.
Lemma 3.4.
sup
φ(x)−ψ(y)≤ℓS(x,y)
φ,ψ∈cl(conv(U◦(X,S)))
∫
X
φdµ+ −
∫
X
ψdµ− = sup
u∈U(X,S)
∫
X
udµ (2)
Proof. First, observe that for any u feasible on the right hand side of (2), φ = ψ = u
is feasible on the left hand side with the same value. Thus, the left hand side is at least the
right hand side.
Now consider φ and ψ feasible for the left hand side. By the constraints, ψ(y) ≥ φ(x) −
ℓS(x, y) for all x ∈ X . Thus, define ψ¯(y) = supx φ(x) − ℓS(x, y). This is finite on X as
ψ¯(y) ≤ ψ(y). We claim that ψ¯ ∈ U(X,S). To show this, it suffices to find a subgradient
sy ∈ S of ψ¯ at each y ∈ X . Observe that sinceX is compact, S is closed, and φ is continuous,
we can write ψ¯(y) = maxx∈X,s∈S φ(x) − s · (x − y). Let sy and xy denote the maximizers
for y. Then for all y′ ∈ X ,
ψ¯(y′) = max
x∈X,s∈S
φ(x) − s · (x − y′)
≥ φ(xy)− sy · (xy − y′)
= φ(xy)− sy · (xy − y)− sy · (y − y′)
= ψ¯(y)− sy · (y − y′)
= ψ¯(y) + sy · (y′ − y)
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Since φ and ψ¯ are feasible for the left hand side of (2), we know that φ(x) ≤ ℓS(x, y)+ψ¯(y)
for all y ∈ X . Thus, we can define φ¯(x) = infy ℓS(x, y)+ ψ¯(y) and observe that φ¯(x) ≥ φ(x).
Further,
∫
X φdµ+ −
∫
X ψdµ− ≤
∫
X φ¯dµ+ −
∫
X ψ¯dµ−.
We claim that φ¯ = ψ¯. For one direction, φ¯(x) ≤ ℓS(x, x) + ψ¯(x) = ψ¯(x). For the other,
φ¯(x) = inf
y
ℓS(x, y) + ψ¯(y) = ψ¯(x) + inf
y
ℓS(x, y) + ψ¯(y)− ψ¯(x) ≥ ψ¯(x).
The last inequality follows because ψ¯ ∈ U(X,S) implies ψ¯(x)−ψ¯(y) ≤ ℓS(x, y). Thus taking
u = ψ¯(= φ¯) is feasible for the right hand side and the value of the right hand side is at least
that of the left hand side.
The proof of the theorem then results by combining the lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
inf
γ∈Radon+(X×X)
γ1−γ2X,Sµ
∫
X×X
ℓS(x, y)dγ(x, y) ≥ sup
u∈U(X,S)
∫
X
udµ
= sup
φ(x)−ψ(y)≤ℓS(x,y)
φ,ψ∈cl(conv(U◦(X,S)))
∫
X
φdµ+ −
∫
X
ψdµ−
= min
γ∈Radon+(X×X)
γ1X,Sµ+
µ−X,Sγ2
∫
X×X
ℓS(x, y)dγ(x, y)
A feasible γ for the final min is also feasible for the initial inf, so the inequality is in fact
an equality and the initial inf is a min.
4. CONCRETE EXAMPLES
In this section, we derive optimal mechanisms for a number of settings where previous
duality results do not apply. Since an optimal mechanism exists for all these settings, Theo-
rem 3.1 guarantees that there exist a u∗ and γ∗ that lead to equality in equation (1). In the
following examples, however, we need only apply the framework to find such a pair, as then
Lemma 3.2 will certify optimality of u∗. To aid us in finding such a pair we make use of the
following powerful corollary of Lemma 3.2 that is a direct generalization from [Daskalakis
et al. 2015], who describe it as providing complementary slackness conditions.
Corollary 4.1. Let u∗ and γ∗ be optimal in (1). Then:
(1 )
∫
X u
∗dµ =
∫
X u
∗d(γ∗1 − γ∗2 ) and
(2 ) ℓS(x, y) = u
∗(x) − u∗(y) γ∗(x, y)-almost everywhere.
Proof. By strong duality, the two inequalities in the proof of Lemma 3.2 are equalities
for u∗ and γ∗. This gives the first claim directly, and the second follows because u∗(x) −
u∗(y) ≤ ℓS(x, y) for all x and y.
From this corollary, and some basic facts about subgradients from convex analysis, we
can identify some additional structure linking u∗ and γ∗ that will guide our search. Let
exp(S) = {s ∈ S | ∃x, y ∈ X s.t. s · (x − y) = ℓS(x, y)} denote the union of exposed faces
of S with respect to X .3 The following lemma shows that, except for a set of measure zero,
these are the only permissible subgradients of u∗.
3Equivalently, the set of points in S supported by (dual) points in C = X −X.
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erywhere. Furthermore, (x− y) is a direction in which s is exposed.
Proof. By Corollary 4.1, ℓS(x, y) = u
∗(x) − u∗(y) γ∗(x, y)-almost everywhere, so con-
sider some x and y that are. For λ ∈ [0, 1], let f(λ) = u∗(λx + (1 − λ)y). If f is not affine,
then ℓS(x, y) 6= u∗(x) − u∗(y), because the steepest slope present could have been used
the whole way. Thus, f is affine and there is some s ∈ S such that s ∈ ∂u∗(y) (the set of
subgradients of u∗ at y) and s · (x − y) = u∗(x) − u∗(y). It is standard (see, e.g.,[Frongillo
and Kash 2014, Lemma 2]) that this implies s ∈ ∂u∗(x). Since ℓS(x, y) = u∗(x) − u∗(y),
s ∈ exp(S), and furthermore is maximal in the (x− y) direction because that is a direction
that shows it is in exp(S).
Lemma 4.2 significantly restricts the space of both optimal mechanisms u∗ and optimal
duals γ∗. For u∗, the only allocations are elements of exp(S). For γ∗, when matching x and
y which share allocation s, they much be chosen to be in a direction where s is exposed.
For example, if S = [0, 1]2, when the allocation is (1, 0.5), γ∗ only matches pairs x and y
where x is to the right of y, while when the allocation is (1, 1) it is allowed to have x be
anything up and to the right of y.
4.1. A Recipe for the Examples
In each of the examples below, we follow the same basic recipe. First, we state the mea-
sure µ for which the optimal mechanism maximizes
∫
u∗dµ. As discussed in Section 2.2,
determining µ is a direct application of the machinery of Daskalakis et al. [2015], so we
simply give the measure without further comment. For some examples, we then identify an
alternate measure µ′ and show that µ′ X,S µ. The γ∗ we ultimately construct will have
the property that γ∗1 − γ∗2 = µ or µ′ as appropriate.
We then propose a mechanism u∗, which we will use to guide our construction of a
matching γ∗ for which strong duality holds, certifying its optimality. A useful construct in
this regard will be the cell of an allocation/subgradient s ∈ S, the set of types allocated
s under u∗, defined formally by cell(s) = {x ∈ X | s ∈ ∂u∗(x)}, where ∂u∗(x) denotes
the set of subgradients of u∗ at x. Lemma 4.2 shows that γ∗1 (cell(s)) = γ
∗
2(cell(s)) =
γ∗(cell(s), cell(s)). Thus, a necessary property of such a u∗ is that for each s ∈ S, µ(cell(s)) =
0, meaning that γ∗ essentially only matches types within the same cell. This property, which
we term the “integrate to zero” condition, guides our construction of γ∗ by allowing us to
construct it on each cell independently.
As Corollary 4.1 tells us that u∗(x) − u∗(y) = ℓS(x, y) for almost every matched pair
(x, y), we must have u∗(x)− u∗(y) = s · (x− y) within a given cell(s); this lets us focus on
pairs such that s ∈ argmaxs′∈S s′ · (x−y). A matching which satisfies this cell condition will
be said to “respect ℓS”. Once we verify that µ(cell(s)) = 0 for u
∗, we then show that such
a γ∗ respecting ℓS exists, either by directly constructing it or by applying Strassen’s [1965]
Theorem (or more precisely a special case of it [Kamae et al. 1977; Lindvall 1999]).
Theorem 4.3 (Strassen’s Theorem in 1 Dimension). Let P be a set of points on a
line segment (and so totally ordered). Let ν+ and ν− be two unsigned measures on P with
ν+(P ) = ν−(P ) such that ν+ st ν−, where st denotes stochastic dominance. Then there
exists an unsigned measure γ on P × P with marginals γ1 = ν+ and γ2 = ν− such that
x > y γ-almost surely.
Strassen’s Theorem allows us to prove the existence of the desired γ∗ without needing to
construct it directly. In many of the examples that follow, the mass of µ+ is restricted to a
1-dimensional set P , but µ− need not be. Nonetheless, this one dimensional set has some
total order ≥P such that if x1 ≥P x2 then for all y in the cell, if u∗(x1)− u∗(y) = ℓS(x1, y)
then u∗(x1, y) = ℓS(x1, y). Intuitively, this ordering means that if γ∗ is “permitted” to
match x2 and y in this sense, it is also permitted to match x1 and y. Thus, ≥P captures
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Fig. 1. (L) The µ for the two-item uniform valuaton setting. (M) The optimal mechanism in this setting
when at most one item can be sold. (R) Construction of a matching γ∗ certifying optimality.
which points in P are least restricted in terms of the matching, effectively reducing to the
1-dimensional case. This reduction is captured by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Let X ′ ⊂ X, e.g. X ′ = cell(s), and ν+ and ν− be two unsigned measures
on X ′ with ν+(X ′) = ν−(X ′). For x ∈ X ′ define A(x) = {y ∈ X ′ | u∗(x)−u∗(y) = ℓS(x, y)}
to be the points in X ′ which can be matched with x. Let P ⊂ X ′ with ν+(P ) = ν+(X ′),
such that the subset relation on A(x) induces a total order on P defined by x ≥P x′ ⇐⇒
A(x′) ⊆ A(x). Letting B(x) = {x′ ∈ P | x ≥P x′}, if ν−(A(x)) ≥ ν+(B(x)) for all x ∈ P ,
there exists a measure γ on X ′ × X ′ with marginals such that γ1 − γ2 = ν+ − ν− and
u∗(x)− u∗(y) = ℓS(x, y) γ-almost surely.
Proof. Define ν′− an unsigned measure on P by ν
′
−(P
′) = ν−({y ∈ X ′ | ∃x ∈ P ′.u∗(x)−
u∗(y) = ℓS(x, y)}. Observe that, by construction, ν′−(B(x)) = ν−(A(x)) for all x ∈ P . By
assumption, ν′−(B(x)) = ν−(A(x)) ≥ ν+(B(x)) for all x ∈ P , so ν+ st ν′−. Thus by
Strassen’s Theorem, there exists a γ′ on P × P with marginals γ′1 = ν+ and γ′2 = ν′− and
x ≥P x′ γ′-almost surely.
Let γ′′({(xi, yi)}) = ν−({yi | xi = min{x | yi ∈ A(x)}}) (where the min is taken according
to ≥P , also implicitly requiring that xi ∈ P ). Note that γ′′1 is a measure on P and ν′− st γ′′1 .
Applying Strassen’s theorem again, we get a γ′′′ with marginals γ′′′1 = ν
′
− and γ
′′′
2 = γ
′′
1 .
Observe that P ⊂ X ′, so if x ≥P x′ then u∗(x)− u∗(x′) = ℓS(x, x′). Therefore, we can take
γ = γ′ + γ′′ + γ′′′, and have it satisfy u∗(x) − u∗(y) = ℓS(x, y) γ-almost surely. Further,
γ1 − γ2 = ν+ + γ′′1 + ν′− − ν′− − ν− − γ′′1 = ν+ − ν−.
Having constructed such a γ∗, we will then have shown
∫
X u
∗dµ =
∫
X×X ℓS dγ
∗, which
certifies optimality of u∗ by weak duality (Lemma 3.2).
4.2. Two items, allocate at most one
In this setting, values are uniform [0, 1] for each item and S = {(p1, p2) | 0 ≤ p1, p2∧p1+p2 ≤
1}. This gives µ with a mass of −3 uniformly distributed on the interior of the unit square,
a point mass of +1 at the origin, and a mass of +1 uniformly distributed on each of the
lines (0, 1)− (1, 1) and (1, 0)− (1, 1). (See Figure 1.)
As we will show, the optimal mechanism here is to offer the choice of either item at a
price of 1/
√
3. This mechanism divides the space into 3 cells: (0, 0) when neither item worth
more than 1/
√
3, (1, 0) when at least one item is worth 1/
√
3 and item one is preferred
to item two, and (0, 1) when at least one is worth 1/
√
3 with item two preferred. Each
cell satisfies the integrate to 0 condition: the no-sale cell has a negative mass inside of∫
0≤p1,p2≤1/
√
3
−3dp1dp2 = −3(1/
√
3)2 = −1 and there is a point mass of 1 at the origin. By
symmetry, the interior of the other cells also integrate to −1, yielding 0 when including the
boundary. Thus, we may turn to constructing γ∗ which only matches points within one of
these cells. For the (0, 0) cell, this matching is trivial, as we match all the negative mass to
the point mass at (0, 0).
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
11
a
B
A
-
+
Fig. 2. (L) Matching for two items, allocating exactly one. (M) Matching for the deterministic mechanism
with two items with exponentially-distributed valuations. (R) Depiction of a non-mean-preserving operation
which is still permitted in the deterministic setting.
It remains to show that for the cell where (without loss of generality) item 1 is sold, we
can match the interior to the boundary such that a point (x1, x2) is matched to a boundary
point (1, x′2) with 1− x′2 ≥ x1 − x2, thus respecting ℓS. For this we apply Lemma 4.4, with
X ′ being the (1, 0) cell, P being its right boundary, and of course ν = µ, as µ+(cell(1, 0)) =
µ−(cell(1, 0)) by the above (we drop the double parentheses when plugging in coordinates).
Here A(1, x′2) = {x | 1−x′2 ≥ x1−x2}∩ cell(1, 0) is the set of points which can be matched
with boundary point (1, x′2) and B(1, x
′
2) = {(1, x2) | 1 ≤ x2 ≤ x′2} is an upward-closed
portion of the boundary; see Figure 1(R). Thus, we need only check that for all a ∈ [0, 1],
µ+(B(1, 1−a)) = a ≤ µ−(A(1, 1−a)). This reduces to two cases: (i) 3(1−1/
√
3)a ≥ a when
0 ≤ a ≤ 1/√3, which holds for all a ≥ 0, and (ii) 1 − 32 (1 − a)2 ≥ a when 1 ≤ a ≤ 1/
√
3,
which is easily checked on the two endpoints a = 1 and a = 1/
√
3.
4.3. Two items, allocate exactly one
In this setting, values are uniform [0, 1] for each item and S = {(p1, p2) | 0 ≤ p1, p2∧p1+p2 =
1}. Thus µ is the same as in the previous example. We claim that the optimal mechanism is
to offer the choice of either the first item at a price of 1/3 or the second item for free. This
mechanism divides the space into two cells, separated by the line x1 = x2 + 1/3. Each cell
satisfies the integrate to 0 condition: the (1, 0) cell has a mass of 2/3 along the boundary
and the interior mass is
∫ 1
1/3
∫ x1−1/3
0
−3dx2dx1 = −2/3. It remains to show that for each
cell, we can match the interior to the boundary such that ℓS(x, y) = y1 − x1 in cell 1 and
similarly for cell 2. For the (1, 0) cell this is easily seen by the same sort of application of
Lemma 4.4 as before, this time looking at the point (1, a) with B(1, a) again being upward
closed: 23 − 32a2 ≥ 23 −a. For the (0, 1) cell, the matching is a bit more complex; Figure 2(L)
diagrams the matching. The dashed line again divides the cells, with the lower right being
the (1, 0) cell, for which we have already described the matching. The (0, 1) cell has several
areas of positive mass to be matched: the top left, two in the top right, and two in the
bottom left. The top left we match the same as the (1, 0) cell. For the rest, our matching
respects ℓS if points on the boundary are matched with points along a line at a 45 degree
angle from them (because it is a translation of y = x); we match the two regions in the top
right in this way. For the bottom left, we take advantage of the fact that we are allowed
to do mean-preserving spreads: we may replace µ with some µ′ where all we have done is
spread (positive) mass out such that at the end of any spreading operation the center of
mass of the mass that has been spread is unchanged (See [Daskalakis et al. 2015, Remark 2]
for additional discussion of why this is permissible). Here we take a mass on the line y = x
and spread it in the (−1, 1) and (1,−1) directions evenly to cancel out the negative mass
in the cell, leaving a residual negative mass of −1 on the line y = x. With this µ′ (which
clearly has not changed the matching in the other cells) we match this line of negative mass
with the origin.
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4.4. Deterministic allocations with two exponential items
In this setting, values are exponentially distributed on [0,∞) with λ1 = 2 and λ2 = 1.
Section 9 of Daskalakis et al. [2013] analyzes this setting and shows that the optimal mech-
anism is randomized (sell both items at a price p∗ of approximately 1.2319, sell item 1
with probability 1 and item 2 with probability 0.5 for a price of 1, sell neither for a price
of 0). Here we consider the optimal deterministic mechanism, captured by the restriction
S = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}, which turns out to be the following: sell both for a price
of approximately 1.2286, and sell just item 1 for a price of approximately 0.9288.4 This
case is a good example to illustrate how our approach extends to deterministic mechanisms
(i.e. non-convex sets of subgradients), since it is the perhaps then simplest case where the
optimal randomized mechanism is not in fact deterministic.
To verify the optimality of the deterministic mechanism, we need to match each of the re-
gions shown in Figure 2(M). The zero region integrates to 0, so every point can be matched
with the origin. However, the other two regions are more problematic, and cannot imme-
diately be matched. Consider the cell where item 1 is sold. To get a “tight” matching, we
can only match along horizontal lines as otherwise we get the added cost from the (1, 1)
subgradient. This leaves negative mass we cannot match at the left boundary with positive
mass out toward infinity, as shown in red in Figure 2(M), where the main dashed red line
has the property that integrating from it to infinity yields zero. This same line shows that
there is also a problem in the cell where both goods are sold, because the line passes through
the zero cell. This means that there is excess positive mass in the lower right “corner” of
this cell which we cannot easily match.
The key to resolving this is shown in Figure 2(R). Suppose we have positive mass at the
two black points. We claim that we can replace µ with a measure µ′ given by moving mass
up from the first one and down from the second one in equal amounts, in a non-mean-
preserving spread. To see why, consider where the two points sit relative to any possible
cell boundary. Since there are only 3 allocations, there are only 9 cases (the gray lines). In
6 of them, the two points end up in the same cell (at least relative to that boundary), so
this move does not change the integral of the function because if we do this to two points
in the same cell it is effectively a mean-preserving spread. In the other three cases we can
only increase the value:
(1) When the boundary is vertical this move has no effect because a vertical boundary
means only item 1 is allocated and we are only changing values for item 2.
(2) When the boundary is horizontal this increases the value because we are increasing the
value for item 2 in a cell where item 2 is allocated and decreasing it where it is not (or
is allocated to a lesser extent).
(3) When the boundary is at 45 degrees the same applies, just item 1 happens to be
(irrelevantly) allocated as well.
While we have drawn this with the line between the points at 45 degrees, but all that
matters is that it is that or steeper.
Note that since we need a strictly lower optimal dual value than the randomized case, for
this operation to be helpful, it must not be permissible in the randomized case. Indeed this
is the case, as we illustrate by the red line, which is a possible boundary in the randomized
case: with such a boundary, our operation decreases the value of the integral, so it would
not be permitted.
We also need to find some mass to move up, and moving mass in the item 1 cell does not
help since we need to move all that positive mass downward. The key is to observe that 45
degree lines near the left end of the item 1 cell pass into the zero cell, and that instead of
4The exact values are those which cause the integrate to zero condition to be satisfied in all three cells.
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matching the negative mass there to the positive mass at the origin we can move the mass
at the origin to those points (which is equally costless). The positive mass is still too far
out in the (1, 0) direction, but we can fix this with a mean-preserving spread along each
horizontal line where we move the mass we need towards zero in exchange for pushing some
mass even further out (this has no effect on the cost of the matching).
To be more explicit about the construction, let pos1(z) =
∫∞
x1=0.9288
µ(x1, 1.2319−0.9288−
z)dx1 be the excess positive mass along the horizontal line a distance z down in the item
1 cell. Similarly, let neg1(z) =
∫ 2(1−0.9288−z)
x2=0
µ(0.9288 + z, x2)dx2 be the excess negative
mass below the dashed red line in Figure 2(M) along the vertical line at x1 = 0.9288+ z. It
is easy to verify that these new measures have the same total measure, are 1 dimensional,
and pos(z) stochastically dominates neg(z). Thus, we can find a matching such that that
the excess positive mass from z1 is matched to excess negative mass z2 such that z2 < z1.
We cannot give a closed form for this, but as we will see this is not needed.
To move this mass downward as described (after first performing a mean-preserving
spread so the mass we need to move downward is just a point mass), we need to move mass
in the zero cell upward. Conveniently, we can do so by moving equal mass on the origin to
any point on the 45 degree line up and to the left from this point mass. Thus, it suffices
to verify that sufficient negative mass always exists on such lines. In fact, let (x∗1, x
∗
2) be
the point at which the red dashed line in Figure 2(M) crosses the boundary between the
cell where no item is sold and the cell where both items are sold. We use only the mass at
points where x1 < x
∗
1, as we will use the mass at points with x1 ≥ x∗1 for the cell where
both items are sold. It is straightforward to verify numerically that such a line that has the
least negative mass (which is exactly the boundary between the zero cell and the cell where
both items are sold), has more mass than any value of neg(z) by at least a factor of 20.
Having created this µ′, we have
∫∞
x1=0.9288
dµ′(x1, x2) = 0 for all x2 < 1.2319 − 0.9288.
On each of these lines the negative mass is entirely to the left of the positive mass, so by
a direct application Strassen’s Theorem we can construct a γ∗ that matches along each of
these lines.
Similarly, in the cell where both items are sold, we can move mass at a 45 degree angle up
and to the left while moving mass in the zero cell at a 45 degree angle down and to the right.
Once this is done, we can then match this cell in the standard way (each negative point
matched to positive point(s) up and to the right of it) via an application of Theorem 7.4
of Daskalakis et al. [2013] (another application of Strassen’s theorem), in the same manner
as their analysis in their Theorem 9.3.
To make this more precise, let pos2(z) =
∫∞
x1=0.9288−z µ(x1, 1.2319 − 0.9288 + z)dx1 be
the excess positive mass along the horizontal line a distance z up in the cell where both
items are sold. Similarly, let neg2(z) =
∫ x∗1−z/2
x1=0
µ(x1, x
∗
1 + x
∗
2 + z/2− x1)dx1 be the excess
negative mass below on the 45 degree line inside the dashed red line shifted upward from
the cell boundary by z. Again Strassen’s theorem shows we can find an appropriate place
to shuffle the excess positive mass to the desired negative mass. To counteract this moving
of positive mass up and to the left on a 45 degree angle, we move mass from the origin to
some point to the right of the point we are moving the excess positive mass out of to create
a negative point mass. By construction, these are all at or to the left of x∗1, thus it suffices
to verify that the total mass to the right of x∗1 is the zero cell excess the total mass we need
to move, which is easily done numerically. Note that the shuffle we performed in this cell
had no effect on the ultimate cost of this matching because moving mass at a 45 degree
angle up and to the left exactly counters the increase in cost from the leftward movement
with the decrease in cost from the upward movement.
Having created this µ′, we can now apply Theorem 7.4 of Daskalakis et al. [2013]. By
construction, we can first match all the horizontal lines with x2 ≤ x∗2 in the same manner
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we did in the cell where item 1 is sold. For the remainder of the cell the application of
Theorem 7.4 of Daskalakis et al. [2013] is now straightforward because we have because as
in their application of it the zero cell is entirely below the dashed red line (what they term
the “absorbing hyperplane”), and our construction of µ′ has not affected any mass above
or to the right of the dashed red line.
4.5. Optimal mechanism for two non-additive items
Consider a setting values are uniform [0, 1] for each item individually but getting both
items is twice as valuable as their sum. Thus X = {(x1, x2, x3) | 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x2 ≤
1, x3 = 2(x1 + x2)} with S = {(p1, p2, p3) | 0 ≤ p1, p2, p3 ∧ p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ 1}. However, it
is convenient to instead use the equivalent representation X = {(x1, x2) | 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1}
with S = conv({(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (2, 2)}), which allows us to use the same µ as in our first
two examples.
We show that grand bundling at a price of
√
8/3 is optimal. (Note that this choice causes
both cells to satisfy the integrate to zero condition). To construct an appropriate γ∗, observe
that a point (x1, x2) with x1 > x2 and 2(x1 + x2) >
√
8/3 can be matched with a point
(1, x) if (2, 2) · ((1, x) − (x1, x2)) ≥ (1, 0) · ((1, x) − (x1, x2)). Again we apply Lemma 4.4
to show that one half of the cell can be matched to the right boundary and the other, by
symmetry to the top boundary. In particular, we take A(1, x′2) = {x | x1 > x2∧2(x1+x2) ≥√
8/3∧2(1−x1+x′2−x2) ≥ 1−x1} is the set of points in the correct half of the cell which
can be matched with boundary point (1, x′2) and B(1, x
′
2) = {(1, x2) | 0 ≤ x2 ≤ x′2} is a
downward-closed portion of the boundary. Thus, we need only check that for all a ∈ [0, 1],
µ+(B(1, 1− a)) = a ≤ µ−(A(1, 1− a)), which is easily verified numerically.
In fact we can generalize this analysis to the case where bundling is α times as valuable
and conclude that grand bundling is optimal at a price of α
√
2/3 if and only if α is greater
than approximately 1.24.
5. DISCUSSION
We have given a duality framework that generalizes that of Daskalakis et al. [2015] by
allowing restrictions on the set of allowable allocations. This allows us to model problems
that previous frameworks could not handle, such as
— non-additive valuations,
—multiple copies of items,
— a requirement that the mechanism be deterministic, and
— allocation restrictions such as matroid constraints.
One particularly interesting combination is an arbitrary convex type space with the con-
straint that the allocation must be a probability distribution. This recovers mechanism
design. Thus, in a sense our framework is fully general.
We have provided both a weak duality result (Lemma 3.2) that provides a recipe for
certifying the optimality of mechanisms, as well as a strong duality result (Theorem 3.1)
which guarantees that such a certificate always exists, even in settings where an optimal
mechanism does not exist. The key technical tool we use is the observation that we can
restrict the set of convex functions to those that correspond to mechanisms that satisfy our
allocation restriction, leading to an alternative integral stochastic order X,S . Using this,
as well as facts from convex analysis about subgradients, we provide a new characterization
result (Lemma 4.2) that identifies the set of allocations an optimal mechanism can use as
those that are exposed points of the set.
For the remainder of the paper, we turn to additional intuition from this lemma, and then
discuss some of the limitations of our results, how these can be relaxed, and other future
research directions.
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5.1. The Simple Economics of Optimal Mechanism Design
In their classic paper, Bulow and Roberts [1989] reinterpreted Myerson’s [1981] characteri-
zation of optimal single item auctions in terms of pricing. In particular, they observed that
his characterization in terms of virtual valuations could instead be described as finding a
price such that the derivative of expected revenue with respect to that price is zero. In the
examples, we made frequent use of the necessary condition that µ(cell(s)) = 0 for each al-
location s ∈ S. As we show, this necessary condition has a simple economic interpretation:
the partial derivative of expected revenue with respect to that price must be zero in an
optimal auction.
Consider an allocation s that is purchased with positive probability in the optimal mech-
anism given by u∗. ∫
cell(s)
u∗dµ =
∫
cell(s)
(x · s− p)dµ(x).
The marginal revenue from selling s is the derivative of this with respect to p, which is∫
cell(s)
−dµ, and by the envelope theorem, this is the marginal revenue of the overall mech-
anism. Thus, by the optimality of u∗ we must have µ(cell(s)) = 0.
This analysis also shows why this necessary condition is not sufficient in our multidimen-
sional setting: for all fixed choices of allocations to offer, there exists an optimal pricing,
but that does not mean that the menu we have chosen to price is the optimal menu.
5.2. Zero Set Mechanisms
Daskalakis et al. [2015] define a class of mechanisms for the additive setting they call zero
set mechanisms. Such mechanisms have two features. First, they either allocate nothing or
allocate at least one good with probability 1. Second, they are entirely determined by the
boundary of the cell where no goods are allocated (i.e. the zero set). Geometrically, this
means the cell for every other allocation borders the zero set. All known optimal mechanisms
for independently distributed items are in this class.
Lemma 4.2 shows that the first property is not an accident. The only allocations in
exp(S) that are not permissible in a zero set mechanism are those which allocate at least
one item with probability zero and there is no item allocated with probability one. Such
allocations would only be permissible if γ∗ were such that we could match all the xs with
that allocations to points y directly above them. All explored µ render this impossible and it
is possible that in fact no such µ exists and all optimal mechanisms for the additive setting
satisfy this first property of zero-set mechanisms.
5.3. Approximate Optimality of Deterministic Mechanisms
A significant current research direction is identifying simple classes of mechanism that are
approximately optimal in some setting [Hart and Nisan 2012; Alaei et al. 2013; Gian-
nakopoulos 2015]. One such simple class is deterministic mechanisms. Let D be a finite
set of deterministic allocations and let conv(D) be the set of allocations that randomizes
over them. Note that ℓD = ℓconv(D), which means that the dual optimization problems dif-
fer only in their set of feasible γ. An interesting future research direction is to try and use
this fact to give a bound on the ratio between optimal revenue and optimal deterministic
revenue settings of interest.
5.4. Limitations
As discussed, our framework is fully general, in that it encompasses all of mechanism design.
However, there are a number of technical caveats that still restrict the applicability of our
results. Most notable is our reliance on Theorem 2.2, which imposes significant restrictions
on the prior f over agent types. Most notably it imposes a differentiability requirement,
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as well as requiring the support of f to be a subset of a compact set. Similarly, several
steps of the proof of Theorem 3.1 rely on the compactness of X . We know that these
restrictions can be relaxed at least somewhat, as the example of exponentially distributed
f shows. Daskalakis et al. [2015] has some discussion related to this relaxation, but a fuller
understanding is an important direction in understanding the limitations of this approach.
A smaller restriction is our requirement that S be closed. This is primarily used in
Lemma 3.4. It is unclear how important relaxing this restriction his however, as most nat-
ural problems seem to yield a closed S. Further, cases with open S are often ones where
no optimal mechanism exists, although it is possible to construct contrived examples where
one still exists.5
Finally, while not a limitation of our framework per se, applying it to practical examples
requires constructing a γ∗ to certify the optimality of u∗. The primary tool we have for
this is Strassen’s theorem, but this is a difficult tool to apply in more than two dimen-
sions. Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias [2014][2015] have had some success in constructing
matchings by using Hall’s theorem on finite approximations of the problem, but even this
approach is difficult to apply in higher dimensions. Better tools here would greatly extend
the practical reach of our framework.
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